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Abstract
This paper studies how the risk of divorce a¤ects the human capital decisions of a young
couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization (one of the spouses uses
up all the education resources) is optimal with no divorce risk. Symmetry in education
(both spouses receive an equal amount of education) then acts like an insurance device
in case of divorce particularly when the institutions do not compensate for di¤erences
in earnings. But, at the same time symmetry in education is less e¢ cient than the
extreme specialization. This is the basic tradeo¤ underlying our analysis. We show
that the symmetric allocation will become more attractive as the probability of divorce
increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor supply elasticity is low. However, it is only
a second-best solution as the insurance protection is achieved at the expense of an
e¢ ciency loss. E¢ ciency can be restored through suitably designed marriage contracts
because they can provide the appropriate insurance against divorce to a couple who
opts for specialization. Finally, we study how the (economic) use of marriage is a¤ected
by the possibility of divorce.
Keywords: post-marital education, marriage contract, divorce
JEL-Classication: D13, J24, K36
1 Introduction
The family received little systematic treatment in economics before the 1950s with
the exception of Malthus and his celebrated model of population growth. The work of
Gary Becker (1965) initiated contemporary research on family economics, which quickly
moved from the narrow study of fertility to an array of dimensions of family life, includ-
ing marriage and divorce.1
One of the most studied topics in family economics is the decision of marriage
and of divorce. Typically, to the question why do we marry, family economists nd a
number of reasons such as sharing of public non rival goods, division of labor to exploit
comparative advantages and increasing returns, extending credit and coordination of
investment activities, risk pooling and coordinating child-care. To the question why do
we divorce, they nd answers, which mix exogenous shocks and institutional settings.
Our paper does not look at why we get married or why we divorce. It takes marriage
as given and views divorce as a random event with a given probability. The main focus
of our paper is how the risk of dissolution a¤ects the human capital decisions of a young
couple. We argue that the risk of divorce along with imperfect alimony rights may have
a distortive impact on the allocation of capital at the start of the marriage. In our
setting, if there were no risk of divorce or if the legal institutions would fully insure ex-
spouses against the risk of divorce, we would have an e¢ cient choice of human capital
and of saving. With divorce and imperfect protection against losses that it may entail,
both saving and education choices may be ine¢ cient.
A number of existing studies are related to our paper. First, there is a literature
showing that the probability of marriage or of divorce may depend on marriage legis-
lation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice; see Cigno
(2007; 2011). A standard reference on divorce is Becker et al. (1977), who try to explain
both theoretically and empirically the observed acceleration of separation and divorce.
In particular they argue that couples are reluctant to invest in skills specicto their
marriage if they anticipate dissolution. They also provide a lot of evidence on the vari-
ous causes behind the steady growth in separations and divorces in the US and most
Western countries.2 There is also a literature on the choice of education and marriage,
1Among the textbooks which cover this evolving eld, see, e.g., Browning et al. (2012), Apps & Rees
(2009) and Cigno (1991).
2See also Lommerud (1989) and Gonzalez and Ozcan (2008) who study the e¤ect that an increase in
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which assumes that education decisions are made before marriage. Education is then
viewed as a¤ecting the competitive strength of potential spouses and the spousal roles
within the marriage.3
The closest papers to ours are by King (1982), Borenstein and Courant (1989),
Lommerud (1989), and Konrad and Lommerud (2000).4 King (1982) studies post mar-
ital education decisions and shows how these are a¤ected by the risk of divorce. He
focuses on investments in human capital and argues that the corresponding property
rights are not clearly dened by the courts.5 Focusing on risk neutral individuals and
abstracting from labor supply decisions, King shows that the couple may end up with
ine¢ cient low human capital investments because of the divorce risk. Borenstein and
Courant (1989) analyze human capital investments of spouses who can nance these
investments either by borrowing on the nancial market or from their partners wealth.
They argue that spouses are only willing to extend credit to their partners if they
can expect to remain married later in life and thereby to prot from their investments.
Consequently, investments in human capital are ine¢ ciently low when there is a divorce
risk and no marriage contract. Lommerud (1989) studies how the probability of divorce
inuences a couples (predivorce) allocation of time between market and home work.
The institutional setting is such that spouses obtain no compensation in case of divorce,
and there is no accumulation of assets. He shows that specialization becomes less likely
for positive divorce risk. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) also study the education de-
cision within a couple, but do not consider the e¤ect of divorce. Their main nding is
that non-cooperation leads to overinvestments in education.
Our paper studies how married couples choose the level of (tertiary) education of
each spouse. Spouses behave cooperatively and they both maximize the sum of their
lifetime expected utilities. They live for two periods. In the rst they are married. At
the beginning of this period education choices are made and then both spouses may
work earning a wage that results from their education choice. At the end of the rst
period they face a given probability of divorce. In case of divorce, they have to count
the risk of divorce may have on labor supply (especially among women), on marriage-specic investments
and on saving.
3This is well-summarized in Browning et al. (2012).
4 In a recent study Fernández and Wong (2011) study a related issue from an empirical prespective.
They show that the reduction in the education gender gap can be explained to great extent by the
increased probability of dicorve risk.
5At least not quite as clearly as for physical capital.
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on their own earning and on a share of the couples accumulated wealth. That share
depends on the family law in place. As is the rule in many countries, we assume that
assets accumulated during marriage are equally shared between the two (ex-)spouse
in case of divorce (see, e.g., §81 EheG for Germany). Additionally, we analyze how
the availability of marriage contracts, which opens up the possibility to compensate for
inequalities of resources resulting from di¤erences in education, a¤ects human capital
investments.
Spouseseducation choices represent a challenging issue, even when the possibility
of divorce is ignored. It has been studied by a number of authors and in particular by
Cremer et al. (2011). The main question these authors focus on is whether there will
be specialization (one of the spouse uses up all the education resources) or symmetry
(both spouses receive an equal amount of education). They show (roughly speaking) that
even when spouses are ex ante identical (same learning ability) specialization is e¢ cient,
unless the education technology involves a su¢ cient degree of decreasing returns.
Our approach is inspired by their model. To get crisp results as to the e¤ects of a
potential divorce, we consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal when
there is no possibility of divorce. This provides us with a simple benchmark. Symmetry
in education then acts like an insurance device in case of divorce particularly when
the institutions do not compensate for di¤erences in earnings. But, at the same time
symmetry in education is less e¢ cient, namely it leads to less aggregate surplus (earnings
net of disutility of labor) than the extreme specialization. This is the basic tradeo¤
underlying our analysis. We show that the symmetric allocation will become more
attractive as the probability of divorce increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor
supply elasticity is low. However, it is only a second-best solution as the insurance
protection is achieved at the expense of an e¢ ciency loss. Furthermore, we show that
suitably designed marriage contracts will restore e¢ ciency because they can provide the
appropriate insurance against divorce to a couple who opts for specialization in human
capital investments. Returning to the case without optimal marriage contracts, the
relationship between divorce probability and human capital decision is more complex
than one would have expected, even in a simple setting like ours. For instance, it
turns out that the relationship between a couples welfare and the education budget
devoted to a given spouse is neither monotonic, nor concave or convex over the full
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range. And while an increase in the divorce probability always makes the symmetric
solution more attractive (compared to complete specialization), it may or may not be
the optimal outcome even for divorce probabilities close to one. In some cases (with
quadratic disutility of labor), the asymmetric solution remains optimal no matter what
(even when risk aversion is very high). In other cases, an interior solution may obtain
and both spouse are educated albeit to a di¤erent degree (in spite of the fact that their
learning ability is the same).
We also study how the (economic) use of marriage is a¤ected by the possibility of
divorce. Whenever the educational budget is shared asymmetrically, it is possible that
the spouse who will get less educated nds a marriage less protable as compared to
staying single and using up her own educational budget. As we will show the use of
marriage again depends on risk aversion, labor supply elasticity and the possibility of
a marriage contract. With a quadratic labor disutility, the surplus generated under
specialization is so large that the worse-o¤ spouse enjoys a higher utility with just
half of the accumulated assets and no labor income than a spouse who stays single.
Additionally, if individuals have the possibility to write a marriage contract which fully
compensates the lower educated spouse in case of divorce, then, the use of a marriage
is always positive since the couple is able to generate a higher surplus as compared to
a single household.
Following Cremer et al. (2011) we make a number of simplifying assumptions to
obtain specialization as the no divorce benchmark. In particular, both spouses have the
same learning skill and the educational technology involves constant returns to scale.
We are only concerned by human capital investments that are chosen at the start of
the marital life. The total amount of human capital investments (the total education
budget) is exogenously given and household decisions are made cooperatively, that is,
both spouses share the same objective of maximizing the sum of their (expected) lifetime
utilities.6
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 denes
the couples optimization problem and analyzes its rst- and second-order conditions.
6Besides Becker (1965), see his Treatise on the Family (1981; 1991), models of the household dont
distinguish between decision-making agents. The alternatives to this unitary model are models assuming
that multi-person households include individual decision-makers. Such models have been coined indi-
vidual models(Apps and Rees, 2010) or collective models(Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori,
1995; Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2012).
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Section 3.5 provides a numerical example. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the optimal marriage
contract and the use of marriage, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a male (subscript m) and a female (subscript f) who live for two periods
t = 1; 2.7 In the rst period the two are married while in the second period, they face a
probability  of getting divorced. Divorce occurs for reasons exogenous to the analysis.
For the time being, we assume that the reasons to enter into the marriage are exogenous
too. In Section 5 we relax this assumption and analyze the individuals economic use
of the marriage. In both periods the two spouses cooperatively decide about labor
supply ` and consumption. While married the two share a common budget whereas
when divorced each individual has to nance his/her own living. In the rst period, the
couple can save part of their income for the next period. Both the interest rate and
time preferences are equal to zero. We consider an institutional framework such that
in case of divorce savings s or, more generally, wealth accumulated during marriage
 are equally divided between the male and the female.8 Per period utility of each
individual depends on consumption of a numeraire commodity c and on labor disutility
v(`). Specically, utility is given by u(c  v(`)) with u0 > 0; v0 > 0 and u00 < 0; v00 > 0.
This quasi-linear specication is adopted for the ease of exposition.
Productivities or wages are endogenous. That is, at the beginning of the rst period,
the couple cooperatively decides about the human capital investments in each of them.
We are only concerned by human capital investments that are made at the start of
marital life. One can think of such investments as, e.g., the tertiary education choice,
or resources invested for job specic skills like learning foreign languages. At the time
of their marriage, each spouse already has some human capital or educational level w
which without loss of generality is normalized to zero. A couples feasible human capital
choices are described by the following technology  :9
  = f(wm; wf )jwm + wf = 2g : (1)
This amounts to assuming that wages are determined by educational expenditures
7Throughout we assume that the couple consists of one women and one man. We make this assump-
tion only for expositional convenience.
8This presumes that a judge is able to observe the couples accumulated wealth.
9See Cremer et al. (2011).
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through a linear technology and that the total budget for human capital investments is
xed. The linear technology implies that productivities can be transferred between
spouses on a one-by-one basis implying that both spouses have the same learning
skills and that there are no decreasing returns to education. This technology incorpor-
ates two extreme scenarios: (i) complete equalization of wages between both spouses,
wm = wf = 1 and (ii) maximum wage inequality, wi = 2 and w i = 0 for i = m; f . In
the latter case all educational resources are concentrated on a single spouse.
The decisions of the couple are taken in a cooperative way. More precisely, the
couple maximizes a common welfare function which is given by the sum of rst- and
second-period (expected) utility of both the male and female; see also Lommerud (1989).
The two spousesutilities are weighted equally and the couples welfare function is thus
given by
W =u  c1cm   v(`1cm)+ u  c1cf   v(`1cf )+  u  c2sm   v(`2sm)+ u  c2sf   v(`2sf )
+ (1  ) u  c2cm   v(`2cm)+ u  c2cf   v(`2cf ) ; (2)
where the rst superscript denotes the period and the second superscript indicates the
marital status of the individuals in the second period (cfor couple and sfor single).
Recall that a divorce occurs with probability  in which case the (ex) spouses are single
in the second period. The budget constraints of a couple who does not divorce (and
thus pools resources in both periods) are given by
c1cm + c
1c
f = wm`
1c
m + wf `
1c
f   s; (3)
c2cm + c
2c
f = wm`
2c
m + wf `
2c
f + s: (4)
In case of divorce the two ex-spouses face separate budget constraints in the second
period. They consume their own labor income plus half of the couples rst period
saving. Formally, we have
c2sm = wm`
2s
m +
s
2
; (5)
c2sf = wf `
2s
f +
s
2
: (6)
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3 The couples optimization problem
3.1 Statement and rst-order conditions
The couple maximizes (2) subject to the budget constraints, equations (3)(6) and the
education technology (1). For expositional convenience, we decompose this problem
into two stages. First, the couple chooses the education levels wm and wf . Second, the
couple chooses savings as well as labor supplies and consumption levels of each of the
spouses in both periods and states of nature (divorce or not). This specic timing is of
no relevance to our results.10
Let us rst consider the second stage optimization problem, that is, the determina-
tion of savings, consumption and labor supply for a given educational decision. Solving
equations (3) and (4) for c1cm and c
2c
m and substituting into the objective function (2)
yields the following optimization problem (t = 1; 2, j = c; s and i = m; f).
max
s;ctji ;`
tj
i
W =u  wm`1cm + wf `1cf   s  c1cf   v(`1cm)+ u  c1cf   v(`1cf )
+ 
h
u

wm`
2s
m +
s
2
  v(`2sm)

+ u

wf `
2s
f +
s
2
  v(`2sf )
i
+ (1  ) u  wm`2cm + wf `2cf + s  c2cf   v(`2cm)+ u  c2cf   v(`2cf ) : (7)
Di¤erentiating, rearranging and dening xtji  ctji   v(`tji ) consumption net of labor
disutility yields the following rst-order conditions
u0(xtcm) = u
0(xtcf ) 8 t (8)
v0(`tji ) = wi 8 t; j; i (9)
u0(x1ci ) =

2

u0(x2sm) + u
0(x2sf )

+ (1  )u0(x2ci ) 8 i: (10)
Consumption levels of married spouses are set so as to equalize their marginal utilities.
Labor supply is independent of time, marital status and gender and is an increasing
function of wage. It is chosen to equalize marginal labor disutility with wages.11 The
optimal level of savings equalizes individuals marginal utility in the rst period and
expected marginal utility in the second period. Note that savings only act as an insur-
ance device for the case of divorce. They provide some measure of protection for an
10Except for the assumption that human capital investments are made (once and for all) at the
beginning of married life and thus before it is known if the couple will e¤ectively divorce or not. Formally
this implies that the levels of wm and wf are unique (there is no period/state of nature superscript).
11The simplication arises because preferences are quasi-linear. They make our argument crisper but
are not essential for our results. In particular our results do not depend on the property that labor
supply increases with wage; see Section A.
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individual who ends up single and has low productivity (and thus low labor income).
Except for the risk of divorce, the two periods are perfectly symmetrical and there is
otherwise no need to accumulate wealth in this setting. Specically when there is no
risk of divorce ( = 0) consumption possibilities are the same in both periods and no
wealth is (dis)accumulated as the interest rate and time preferences are zero.12
Let us now turn to the rst stage, the educational decision. Specically, we want to
study whether one of the extreme solutions (equalization or maximum di¤erentiation
of wages) emerges. With our quasi-linear specication we can reduce this problem to a
single dimension, namely the choice of one of the spouses productivity level. To do so,
we substitute the optimal consumption, labor supply and savings decisions as dened
by equations (8) to (10) back into the welfare function (2). Additionally, we take the
educational technology wi = 2   w i as dened by (1) into account and generate the
optimal value function 
(wi) =W(c; `; s; wi), which relates individual-is wage rate
wi with maximum welfare given optimally chosen consumption, c, labor supply, `,
and savings, s.13 Optimal wages wi solve
wi 2 arg maxwi 
(wi);
where 
(wi) is given by

(wi) =2u

(2  wi)` i + wi`i   v(` i)  v(`i )  s
2

+ 

u

(2  wi)` i   v(` i) +
s
2

+ u

wi`

i   v(`i ) +
s
2

+ (1  )2u

(2  wi)` i + wi`i   v(` i)  v(`i ) + s
2

: (11)
In the remainder of this section, we study the properties of 
 in order to determine
the optimal human capital investment decision and to study the impact of parameters
like the divorce probability and risk aversion. Even though we have now reduced the
problem to a single dimension this turns out to be a non-trivial exercise since the global
behavior of 
 is more complex than one could have anticipated. We shall proceed
in di¤erent steps by deriving rst- and second-order conditions and by proving some
12 In reality couples may save for various non divorce related reasons, including retirement preparation.
To account for this we could introduce a third period during which people retire. This would complicate
the analysis without a¤ecting the results.
13c and ` are vectors and are short for optimal consumption/labor supply of male and female in
both periods and states.
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additional properties (while discussing the underlying intuition). To show that various
congurations can arise we will also make use of numerical examples. A proposition
summarizing the ndings will be presented at the end of the section.
Using the envelope theorem, the rst-order condition (FOC) with respect to wi is
given by
@
(wi)
@wi
=2u0(x1c)
 ` i + `i
2

+ 
 
u0(x2si )`

i   u0(x2s i)` i

+ (1  )2u0(x2c)
 ` i + `i
2

: (12)
Evaluating equation (12) at equal wages wi = w i = 1 yields
@
(1)
@wi
= 0
as `mjwm=1 = `f jwf=1 = ` and sjwm=wf=1 = 0 implying xtji = x 8 t; i; j. In other
words, the FOC is always satised for equal wages and one might be tempted to conclude
that it is always optimal for the couple to equalize wage rates. However, we already
know from Cremer et al. (2011) that when  = 0, wage equalization is never optimal.
Consequently, we certainly cannot restrict our attention to the FOC at equal wages.
We also have to look at the second-order condition (SOC) and the global behavior of
the objective function. A rst interesting fact is revealed by evaluating the FOC (12)
at unequal wages wi = 2 and w i = 0 which yields
@
(2)
@wi
= 2u0(x1c)
`i
2
+ u0(x2si )`

i + (1  )2u0(x2c)
`i
2
> 0:
Alternatively, considering the symmetric solution wi = 0 and w i = 2 yields14
@
(0)
@wi
=  2u0(x1c)`

 i
2
  u0(x2si )` i   (1  )2u0(x2c)
` i
2
< 0:
In other words, slightly moving away from the extreme solution with maximum wage
di¤erentiation always reduces welfare. To get further insight, we now turn to the second-
order condition.
14Where `i for wi = 2 and w i = 0 is equal to `

 i for wi = 0 and w i = 2.
9
3.2 Second-order condition
The SOC is given by
@2
(wi)
@w2i
=2
 
u00(x1c) + (1  )u00(x2c) ` i + `i
2
2
+ 

u0(x2si )
@`i
@wi
  u0(x2s i)
@` i
@wi

+ 

u00(x2si )(`

i )
2 + u00(x2s i)(`

 i)
2

+
 
u0(x1c) + (1  )u0(x2c) @`i
@wi
  @`

 i
@wi

: (13)
Evaluating this expression at equal wage rates yields
@2
(1)
@w2i
= 2u00(x)(`)2 + 4u00(x)
@`
@wi
= 2u0(x)` (2"`;w   `) ? 0;
where  =  u00=u0 denotes absolute risk aversion and "`;w = (@`=@w)(w=`) is the
labor supply elasticity. The couples welfare is thus a convex function of wi at equal
wages whenever
"`;w >
`
2
: (14)
When this condition holds we can rule out wage equalization (as it is then a local
minimum). This is the case when the divorce probability or the degree of risk aversion
are su¢ ciently small (particularly when the couple is risk neutral), or when labor supply
elasticity is su¢ ciently large. Absent the possibility of divorce ( = 0) we return to
the setting of Cremer et al. (2011), who show that welfare (which with our quasi-linear
specication reduces to surplus) is highest under maximum wage di¤erentiation. Under
risk neutrality, it is plain that this result remains valid when divorce is introduced
( > 0). While divorce a¤ects individual utility of the (ex)-spouses it has no impact on
total surplus which is all what matters in this case.
3.3 The no divorce case: intuition
Before proceeding it is interesting to have a look at the intuition for the wage di¤erenti-
ation result when there is no divorce. When the couple remains married in period 2 for
sure, the two period setting is of no relevance and the couples objective is equivalent
to the maximization of total surplus. When the couple equally shares the education
budget both spouses work, incurring labor disutility v(`(1)), and their labor income
amounts to 1`(1) + 1`(1) = 2`(1); see Figure 1 (a). Total surplus is equal to twice the
area of the upper triangle. On the other hand, when the entire education budget is
10
Figure 1: Optimal labor supply and surplus for (a) equal and (b) unequal wages.
invested in a single spouse, total labor income (earned solely by the spouse with a wage
of 2) amounts to 2`(2). In the process, one spouse incurs no labor disutility while the
other ones disutility is determined by a labor of `(2); see Figure 1 (b). Total surplus
is now equal to the area of the upper triangle which exceeds the level achieved in (a).
One might at rst be tempted to think that this result is based on the property that
labor supply increases with wage so that `(2) > `(1). However, this is not necessary.
As a matter of fact, labor supply needs not to be adjusted in an optimal way. For
instance, when we switch from equal wages to maximal wage di¤erentiation, we could
achieve a welfare improvement simply by maintaining labor supply of the productive
spouse at `(1) who would then earn 2`(1). In other words, total income is unchanged,
but labor disutility is cut in half; see the dotted line in Figure 1 (b). This argument
is presented more formally in Appendix A, where we show that the result continues to
hold for general utility function (irrespective of the properties of labor supply).
This argument does not change when  > 0 but individuals are risk-neutral with
u00 = 0 and thus  = 0. However, when individuals are risk averse, the possibility
of divorce may a¤ect the couples human capital investment decisions. In particular,
the equal wage solution now becomes more attractive. To see this, let us study how
11
  
(2)  
(1) changes as  increases. We have

(1) =4u[`(1)  v(`(1))] (15)

(2) =2u

2`(2)  v(`(2))  s
2

+ 

u

s
2

+ u

2`(2)  v(`(2)) + s

2

(16)
+ (1  )2u

2`(2)  v(`(2)) + s
2

:
Di¤erentiating with respect to  and making use of Jensens inequality yields
@
@
= u

s
2

+ u

2`(2)  v(`(2)) + s

2

  2u

2`(2)  v(`(2)) + s
2

 0; (17)
where the inequality is strict when u00 < 0.
While the couples utility under wage equalization does not depend on , welfare
under maximum wage di¤erentiation decreases as the probability of divorce increases.
Intuitively, when divorce is possible, under wage di¤erentiation the spouses second
period consumption levels are random variables which is not desirable when individuals
are risk averse. More specically, the total surplus of the couple in the second period
is the same in both states of nature, but it is split unequally in the case of divorce.
This decreases expected utility. Observe that this welfare loss will be larger the larger
the degree of concavity of u (as measured for instance by the degree of risk aversion
). Once again this result appears to rely on our specication of preferences because
we use the property that the couples total surplus is the same in both states of nature.
However, this is not e¤ectively necessary for our result to obtain. A simple inspection
of (16) suggest that  will be decreasing in w as long as the couples utility in case
of divorce is smaller than that when the couple persists. But this is necessarily true
because the married couple can always choose the same consumption and labor prole
than it would under divorce; see Appendix A for a formal proof.
To sum up, we have shown that wage equalization becomes more attractive as the
divorce probability increases (provided that  > 0). In addition, the second order
condition (14) shows that as  increases (and provided that  is su¢ ciently large) wage
equalization will eventually become a local maximum. Putting these two properties
together one might be tempted to conjecture that when  and  are su¢ ciently large,
wage equalization would necessarily become the optimal policy. However, this conjecture
is misleading as the following example with a quadratic disutility of labor shows.
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3.4 Example: quadratic labor disutility
Assume for the time being that labor disutility is given by v(`) = `2=2. Then, by
equation (9) optimal labor supply is `tji = wi 8 t; j; i. From equation (8) we know that
consumption levels while married are chosen so as to equalize marginal utilities of the
male and female i.e., x1cm = x
1c
f . Substituting the education technology w i = 2   wi
into the objective function yields
W(wi; s) =2u

(w2i + (2  wi)2)=2  s
2

+ 

u

w2i + s
2

+ u

(2  wi)2 + s
2

+ (1  )2u

(w2i + (2  wi)2)=2 + s
2

:
Welfare with equal wages, W(wi = w i = 1), and unequal wages, W(wi = 2; w i = 0),
is given by the following two expressions
W(wi = 1; s) =2u

1  s
2

+ 

u

1 + s
2

+ u

1 + s
2

+ (1  )2u

1 + s
2

W(wi = 2; s) =2u

2  s
2

+ 

u

4 + s
2

+ u

0 + s
2

+ (1  )2u

2 + s
2

The optimal savings decision for equal wages is given by s = 0 implying xtji = 1=2 8 t; i; j.
Consequently, each spouse has a utility level of u(1=2) in both periods and states of
nature. Now consider unequal wages and set savings equal to one i.e., s = 1; while this
is not (in general) the optimal savings decision, it represents a feasible level. Then, utility
for each spouse in the rst period and for the single household with low productivity
remains at u(1=2). However, utility when married in the second period and utility for the
high-productivity single household increases (exceeds u(1=2)). Consequently, extreme
wage di¤erentiation always dominates wage equalization, even when  is equal or close
to 1 and when the degree of risk aversion tends to innity. In other words, it is never
optimal for the couple to equalize wages with quadratic labor disutility. Intuitively this
result arises because with quadratic labor disutility the gain in surplus achieved by wage
di¤erentiation (as compared to equalization) is so large that the couple can generate a
su¢ cient amount of saving to ensure that each spouse is better o¤ in any contingency.
To sum up, we have established that maximum wage di¤erentiation is optimal when
the probability of divorce is zero and that it may remain optimal even when divorce
probability and risk aversion are high. On the other hand, we have shown that wage
equalization becomes more attractive as  increases. This leads quite naturally to the
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following two questions. First, are there cases in which wage equalization e¤ectively
becomes the optimal policy? Second, can we ever have an interior solutionthat is a
situation where neither of the extreme policies is optimal.
Since it turns out that the answer to both of these questions is a¢ rmative it is easiest
to show this by a series of numerical illustrations.
3.5 Numerical illustration
Our simulations are based on the following functional form for individual utility
u(c; `) =
8><>:

c  `1+1="
1+1="
1 
1  for  6= 1
ln

c  `1+1="1+1="

for  = 1:
(18)
Notation are chosen so that  and " e¤ectively represents relative risk aversion and
labor supply elasticity with this specic functional form.
Figure 2 depicts 
(w) for  = 2 and " = 0:5 and for various levels of the divorce prob-
ability, ranging from 0 to 1. Not surprisingly all the curves are symmetric around w = 1
and welfare always decreases in the neighborhood of w = 0 or w = 2. When the divorce
probability is zero, 
 is a nice u-shaped function; maximum wage di¤erentiation is
optimal and equal wages yield a local (and global) minimum. As  increases, (extreme)
wage di¤erentiation becomes less attractive. First, wage equalization becomes a local
(but not global) optimum (see  = 0:4) and eventually the global optimum ( = 0:60).
For the parameter values considered in this example, there is never an intermediate
solution with partial wage di¤erentiation.
Figure 3 shows that such an intermediate wage di¤erentiation is possible for  = 2,
" = 0:18 and  = 0:1. However, the range of parameter values for which such a solution
occurs is small. The bang-bang type of solution described in the previous gure is a more
typical outcome. However, since our examples are have no pretense to be empirically
realistic, the meaning of the word typicalhas to be qualied accordingly.
3.6 Section summary
The main results obtained in this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a couple which determines its human capital investment ac-
cording to the education technology (1) and whose welfare function is given by (2). We
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have
(i) When there is no divorce ( = 0) and/or spouses are risk neutral ( = 0), maximum
wage di¤erentiation (wi = 2 and w i = 0) is always optimal. This solution continues
to be a local maximum for all 0 <   1 and  > 0.
(ii) Welfare under maximum wage di¤erentiation decreases with  (provided that  > 0),
while welfare with equal wages does not depend on .
(iii) A su¢ ciently large divorce probability may or may not make wage equalization op-
timal. Specically, with a quadratic disutility of labor maximum di¤erentiation remains
optimal, independent how large the degree of risk aversion  and the divorce probability.
(iv) Intermediate levels of wage di¤erentiation may be optimal for some parameter val-
ues, but a bang-bang solution where we switch from maximum di¤erentiation to full
equalization as  increases is also possible.
4 The marriage contract
Our model shows that for a positive divorce probability, the optimal education decision
faces a trade-o¤ between maximization of net income and hedging against the risk
of divorce and relying on one owns income. While the former calls for maximum
wage di¤erentiation, the latter calls for equal wages. This result is contingent on the
underlying institutional and legal framework which assumes that savings are equally
divided in case of divorce. Wealth accumulation while being married thus also implies
a hedge (although an imperfect one) against ending up with low human capital and,
hence, low income in case of divorce. Now, assume the institutional framework also
includes the possibility to write a marriage contract which can be enforced by law at no
costs. That is in the rst period the couple has the possibility to commit to a transfer
scheme for the case of divorce in the second period. The optimal transfer scheme, or
alimony, fTm;Tfg the couple agrees upon in the rst period is determined by solving:
max
s;ctji ;`
tj
i ;Ti
W =u  c1cm   v(`1cm)+ u  c1cf   v(`1cf )+  u  c2sm   v(`2sm)+ u  c2sf   v(`2sf )
+ (1  ) u  c2cm   v(`2cm)+ u  c2cf   v(`2cf )
s.t. (3); (4); Tm + Tf = 0
c2sm = wm`
2s
m + 0:5s+ Tm and c
2s
f = wf `
2s
f + 0:5s+ Tf :
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Again, labor supply and consumption are chosen according to (8) and (9). The optimal
transfer in case of divorce equalizes marginal utilities of the male and female when single:
T f =  T m =
wm`

m   v(`m)  (2  wm)`f + v(`f )
2
:
With the above marriage contract, savings are no longer needed to ensure a minimum
consumption of the low-wage single household in case of divorce so that we now have
s = 0. Thus, the optimization problem reduces to
max
wi
W(wi) = 4u

(2  wi)` i + wi`i   v(` i)  v(`i )
2

:
In other words we return to the case where the couple maximizes total surplus exactly
like in the previous section when  = 0 and/or  = 0. Consequently, if the couple agrees
on a marriage contract in the rst period the solution always implies maximum wage
di¤erentiation. Divorce, which was problematic for the low productivity ex-spouse in the
absence of marriage contracts is now no longer a problem. The human capital decision
can be based on e¢ ciency only even if that results in concentrating all investments
on a single individual. Thanks to the optimally designed marriage contract the less
productive spouse is fully protected against the risk of divorce.
This result rests of course on the strong assumption that there is no uncertainty as
to the enforcement of the marriage contact (nor is there any moral hazard in the most
productive spouses labor force participation).
Comparing this solution with the one obtained in the previous section shows that the
availability of (perfect) marriage contracts corrects two potential types of ine¢ ciency
brought about by divorce. First, it ensures that the surplus maximizing human capital
allocation is implemented. Recall that without marriage contract this may or may not
be true. Second, there is no longer any need for the couple to have positive saving.
Remember that in our setting saving is useful only in that it may provide (partial)
insurance to the less productive spouse. In other words, saving per se is ine¢ cient in
our setting and the availability of marriage contracts removes this source of ine¢ ciency.
Proposition 2 If the couple can commit to a marriage contract while married in the
rst period, the entire educational budget is invested in one spouse, yielding maximum
wage di¤erentiation (wi = 0 and w

 i = 2) irrespective of the probability of divorce or
the degree of risk aversion. Savings are equal to zero and the higher educated spouse
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transfers half of his net income (consumption minus the monetary loss due to labor
supply) to the other spouse in case of divorce.
5 The (economic) use of marriage
Our earlier analysis shows that the more unequal the educational budget is divided
between the spouses, the higher the surplus the couple generates. We can now ask
about the economic use(or benet) of the marriage. Specically, is it worth for both
the male and the female from an economic point of view to marry in the rst place. In
Beckers (1993; 1974) seminal theory of marriage, two individuals marry when marriage
comes along with a positive surplus relative to the two remaining single.15 Assume each
of the two individuals has half of the education budget without getting married, then
wages are given by wf = wm = 1 and utility when staying single amounts to
U singlei = 2u(1`i   v(`i)) for i = m; f
On the other hand, when getting married utility of each individual is given by
Umarriedi = u(c
1c
i   v(`1ci )) + u(c2si   v(`2si )) + (1  )u(c2ci   v(`2ci ))
where consumption, labor supply, savings and wages are determined by equations (8)
to (10) and (12). Obviously, if an equal wage distribution is optimal from the couples
point of view then both partners are equally well o¤when marrying and when remaining
single. However, whenever an unequal wage distribution is optimal, utility while married
di¤ers between the male and female unless  = 0. While the spouse who receives the
higher share of the education budget is never worse o¤ compared to his/her single status,
the one who gets the smaller share of the cake may well be better o¤ with staying
single. From Subsection 3.4 we know that for quadratic labor disutility an unequal
wage distribution Pareto-dominates equal wages. In other words, the economic use of
a marriage is always positive for the female and the male if the labor supply elasticity
is " = 1. If the probability of divorce is zero, or the two can commit to a marriage
contract, then, even the lower educated individual prots from the surplus generated
by investing the whole education budget in one spouse as this surplus is equally divided
between the two of them. We summarize our ndings in the following proposition:
15Cigno (2009) shows that the decision to marry also depends on the choice of game after marriage.
He nds that a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device for cooperation.
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Proposition 3 Both spouses necessarily prot from a marriage if (i) the divorce prob-
ability is zero, (ii) labor disutility is quadratic, or (iii) they can commit to marriage
contract.
While this proposition provides a number of cases where marriage is benecial for
both spouses, there is no guarantee that this is always the case in our setting. As a
matter of fact it is quite easy to provide counterexamples. To see this let us return to
the numerical specication used in Subsection 3.5 which assumes that utility is dened
by (18). Figure 4 illustrates the economic use for each individual for  = 1 and " =
0:5. For small divorce probabilities the expected utility of a marriage is higher for
both individuals than when staying single. Even though in this case an unequal wage
distribution is optimal, the additional surplus generated through specialization in the
marriage exceeds the possible loss in case of divorce. For larger divorce probabilities the
partner with the lower productivity is worse o¤ with a marriage. The surplus created
through specialization is too low to o¤set the possible utility losses in case of divorce.
Finally, for even higher divorce rates (above 60 percent in the considered example)
equal wages are optimal, so that utility when getting married and when staying single
coincide.
To sum up, for low divorce probabilities marriage is benecial for both partners; for
intermediate levels, the low productivity spouse is worse o¤. Finally when the divorce
probability is su¢ ciently large (and parameters are so that equal wages become optimal)
marriage leaves utilities (and human capital investment decisions) una¤ected.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined how a couples (tertiary) education choices are a¤ected by the
possibility of divorce (seen as a random exogenous event). It has considered a simple
setting where absent the possibility of divorce, it is optimal for the couple to specialize
and invest the whole educational budget in one spouse. This maximum wage di¤eren-
tiation maximizes the couples overall surplus and hence welfare. If the probability of
divorce becomes positive optimal human capital investments depend on risk aversion
and the labor supply elasticity. A higher risk aversion thereby makes the symmetric
solution (equal wage distribution) more likely, whereas a higher labor supply elasticity
provokes more specialization (a more unequal wage distribution) between the husband
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Figure 4: The economic use of a marriage.
and wife. This result presumes that accumulated wealth is equally divided between the
two individuals. If, additionally, the couple can commit to a marriage contract at the
beginning of their marriage specialization is always optimal granted that the contract
fully compensate the losers for his/her losses. While the marriage decision is always
positive with a marriage contract, it may well turn negative for one of the spouses in
case of medium divorce probabilities and no marriage contract. Throughout the paper
we made some restricting assumption.
To obtain a clearcut benchmark we have assumed constant returns to education
(following Cremer et al., 2011). Decreasing returns in the couples education technology
could a¤ect the no divorce benchmark. However, the degree of decreasing returns must
be su¢ ciently strong to do away with the specialization result (see also Cremer et al.,
2011). When this occurs, there is no longer any need to provide insurance against (the
nancial implications) of divorce. Additionally, we assumed a uniform learning ability.
If we were to assume di¤erent learning abilities, then our results are only strengthened.
The main di¤erence would be that the spouse with the higher wage level would be the
more able.
Among possible extensions to this paper, myopia and taxation could be considered.
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It is often argued that love is blind, in other words, when just married the couple may
(partly) ignore their probability of getting divorced later in life. Witness the reluctance
that young couples have to sign a marriage contract that would cope with the possibility
of divorce and its unpleasant outcomes. In France, 16% of all couples draw up a contract
when they get married and 3% do so in the years that follow, making a total of 19% of
married couples (see Barthez and Laferrere, 1996). Myopia has consequences for human
capital investments. Assume the couple completely ignores a possible divorce in the
second period; then, the optimization problem reduces to maximization of the couples
common budget and this is maximized whenever the couple puts all eggs in one basket.
In other words, myopia concerning the divorce probability leads to a more unequal wage
distribution between the male and the female.
Another natural extension concerns public policy, which is assumed away in this
paper with the exception of the marriage contract that needs a public authority to be
enforced. In this paper we just considered two types of contracts. A richer variety of
contracts and alimony rules could be analyzed. Further in the case couples decide to
choose an equal investment in human capital and excessive saving, through an appropri-
ate tax/transfer policy one could achieve a more e¢ cient level of saving and educational
choice.
Appendix
A General Utility
Throughout the paper we assume quasi-linear preference (with no income e¤ect) and
a utility function given by u(ci   v(`i)). This specication implies that labor supply is
always increasing in wage and one might be tempted to think that this is crucial for
our results. However, this is not the case. We use this specication for simplicity and
to be able to reduce the problem to a single dimension. But this is just a matter of
exposition. Proposition 1 continues to be valid for general utility functions. This is
obvious for items iii) and iv), but needs to be established for i) and ii).
The result that maximum wage di¤erentiation is optimal for  = 0 with general
utility functions follows directly form Cremer et al. (2011). The theoretical argument
e¤ectively formalizes the intuition explained in Subsection 3.3 above. To make this
paper self-contained we briey sketch this main argument. Assume the general utility
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function u(ci; `i), then, for equal wages and  = 0 we will have ci = wi`i = `i and s = 0
(spouses consume their own incomes, which are equal and saving is zero). Welfare is
then given by
WE = 4u  `E ; `E ; (A1)
where
`E = argmax
`
u (`; `) : (A2)
With unequal wages, wi = 2 and w i = 0, the spouse with wi = 0 does not work and
earns no income but he/she gets a compensation from the spouse with higher human
capital (as optimally marginal utilities are equalized). Denoting this transfer T , the
couples welfare is given by
WMD = max
`i;` i;T
2u (wi`i   T; `i) + 2u (w i` i + T; ` i) ;
= 2u(2`MDi   T; `MDi ) + 2u(0 + T; 0);
where we have ` i = 0. Observe that as long as  = 0 we have s = 0 and the two periods
are perfectly symmetrical. Now assume the individual with higher human capital gives
simply half of her income to her spouse (T = `MDi ) so that consumption levels are
equalized (which is generally not the optimal level). Additionally, set `MDi = `
E , so
that the individual with wi = 2 works the same number of hours as with equal wages
(which is generally also not optimal). With these two assumptions, we have
WMD = 2u  `E ; `E+ 2u  `E ; 0 >WE :
In words, under wage di¤erentiation the couple can achieve the same consumption levels
as under wage equalization by having only a single individual work (the same amount
as under wage equalization). Intuitively this is simply a generalization of the argument
discussed in Subsection 3.3 and represented in Figure 1. This establishes the item i) of
Proposition 1 continues to be valid with more general utility function.
Introducing a positive  the couples welfare with general utility functions is re-
dened as
W =u  c1cm; `1cm+ u  c1cf ; `1cf +  u  c2sm ; `2sm+ u  c2sf ; `2sf 
+ (1  ) u  c2cm; `2cm+ u  c2cf ; `2cf  : (A3)
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Budget constraints are unchanged and continue to be given by (3)(6).16 Under equal
wages, maximizing (A3) subject to (3)(6) yields ctji = `
tj
i = `
E dened by (A2) so
that welfare is given by WE = 4u  `E ; `E which does not depend on . Under unequal
wages (wi = 2 and w i = 0), di¤erentiating welfare with respect to , while using the
envelope theorem yields
@W
@
=

u
 
c2sm ; `
2s
m

+ u
 
c2sf ; `
2s
f
  u  c2cm; `2cm+ u  c2cf ; `2cf   0:
To establish the inequality, observe that the second term in brackets is the utility of the
married couple while the rst term is the utility of the divorced spouses. Since savings
and productivities are the same in both cases the utility of the married couple is always
at least as large as that of the divorced spouses. This is because the (c; `) bundles
chosen by the divorced spouses are feasible for the married couple (while the opposite
is not true). Consequently, item ii) of the proposition stating that wage di¤erentiation
becomes less attractive as  increases remains valid with general utility. To sum up,
none of these results requires an increasing labor supply function.
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